event of concern, which deserves a careful investigation and requests that Ms. Smith commence an inspection of the pain clinic (e.g., evidence of any construction, water damage) and to inquire about any potential additional cases.
Day 3: Thursday, Sept 20 IP from STH contacts Dr. Kainer and confirms that index case had an epidural steroid injection (ESI) at STONC; provides details of the procedure. Because the Facility Manager of STONC is on vacation, the IP at STH continues to help in the investigation.
Dr. Kainer contacts Dr. Perz at the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion (DHQP), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to ask whether any cases of Aspergillus meningitis had been reported to CDC from any other ambulatory surgery centers (ASC) or pain clinics. Fungal meningitis is rare, but is not required to be reported to the CDC. Even without any requirement, clinicians or states often contact CDC about unusual infections; however, no one had recently contacted the Mycotics Branch at CDC to report any cases of Aspergillus meningitis.
STH reports two additional patients with meningitis with high levels of white blood cells but no known cause. Both had undergone ESIs at STONC. Diagnoses were complicated because the patients appeared to be getting better and the cause of their meningitis was unknown. Dr. Kainer worked with clinicians to request exhaustive diagnostic tests. They also had ESI performed by same anesthesiologist at STONC. The preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate used in their ESIs was obtained from New England Compounding Center (NECC).
Arrange for one on Dr Kainer's staff to visit STONC the next morning, with the IP and the ID physician from STH.
On this day, STONC closes voluntarily, sequesters supplies and orders new supplies from other distributors. Visit to STONC by TDH staff for a careful review of all procedures and the physical environment: no evidence observed of environmental conditions that would have led to fungal contamination of procedures.
TDH contacts CDC and describes findings of site visit. TDH asks CDC to help with laboratory testing of patients with meningitis of unknown cause (because fungus is very hard to diagnose) and also for testing of environmental samples from the clinic, if needed.
Another patient with meningitis and stroke with a history of ESI at STONC is identified, while VUMC also reports yet another patient who had a stroke and had an epidural injection, but at the time it was not clear where the ESI was done (it was confirmed as STONC on TDH sent out a Health Alert using our TN Health Alert Network (THAN), asking clinicians to look for and report any cases of meningitis following epidural injection to the TDH.
At this time, the leading suspected causes of meningitis were the contrast media and methylprednisolone acetate (MPA) from NECC because both were used in each patient (and are commonly given together for an ESI). Other less likely possibilities included local anesthetic, local skin preparation and needles used for the injection. The first clear evidence that the meningitis cause is not related to the STONC clinic: North Carolina (NC) reports a patient with meningitis exposed to MPA from NECC.
Day 11
It is still not absolutely clear that the MPA from NECC is the only Friday possible source of contamination: the NC case patient had also Sept 28 received lidocaine and povidone iodine from the same manufacturers used by STONC. The lidocaine was the same lot number.
CDC notifies all State Health Departments of situation and urges them to contact clinics who do ESIs to ask them to contact and check on the health of recipients of MPA using a script prepared by CDC. They ask that this be done immediately, not waiting until after the weekend.
CDC issues another national Epi-X alert indicating that this now is a multi-state outbreak and requesting reports of meningitis, other neurological infections, and stroke. TDH sends its own alert through THAN to clinicians and hospitals in TN to look for and report meningitis, stroke and focal infections in patients who have had epidural injections.
Still, all diagnostic tests on these cases remain negative. The only patient with a confirmed diagnosis remains the first case patient reported. This highlights the difficulty of diagnosing a fungal infection, even when one is looking very hard to find it. For the first time since the initial report, a tissue biopsy from a case patient shows a fungus. However, the fungus looks different than Aspergillus. More tests must be done to identify it.
TDH issues another alert through THAN to clinicians to help them identify, diagnose and treat ill persons exposed to MPA from NECC.
TDH analysis of STONC patients suggests that one particular lot of the 3 NECC MPA lots present at STONC is the most likely to make patients sick: Lot 06292012. analyze the data swiftly to determine the cause of the outbreak and those at highest risk of getting sick. ii. In Tennessee, if the recall had been delayed by 9 days, we estimate that at this time we would have seen an additional 59 cases and at least 5 additional deaths. If treatment guidance from CDC had been delayed, the number of deaths would be even higher. iii. To prevent healthcare associated infections, the team has built very close relationships with infection preventionists at hospitals, the Tennessee Hospital Association and is building relationships with the ambulatory surgery center community. These relationships are built on mutual trust and have been invaluable in promoting open communication. b. Surge capacity was provided by staff funded under the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) grant and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreements as well as an additional CDC/CSTE fellow and an Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officer assigned to Tennessee. i. These staff funded provided assistance in reviewing clinical information on suspect and confirmed cases, and in tracking down 1,009 exposed patients. Contact by phone or in person was made by local public health department staff, funded by the state of Tennessee, sometimes with assistance from law enforcement. Outreach included frequent telephone calls and door to door tracking, including home visits whenever necessary. Some exposed patients were living in or traveling in other states or were overseas when they developed symptoms. ii. The State Health Operations Center provided the necessary infrastructure to coordinate activities among the 170 public health staff in Tennessee. iii. The alert network (THAN) connecting TDH with clinicians and staff at hospitals was invaluable in rapidly getting information out. iv. We were able to use a database designed for tracking persons in shelters to track patients who were exposed.
3) Relationships with Federal partners were critical in the response to this outbreak. 4) Relationships and Infrastructure a. By focusing on emergency preparedness and on reducing healthcare associated infections, we have made much progress in enabling rapid communication between public health and hospitals; however challenges remain, especially with providers who do not work in hospitals (e.g., ambulatory surgery centers) and with medical specialists who are not traditional emergency response partners. b. Use of electronic health records allowed tremendous savings in time in allowing us to monitor the clinical progress of patients and saved time and resources at the affected hospitals. c. This outbreak illustrated the tremendous importance of inter-facility communication when patients may seek medical services in multiple facilities for complications that arise from treatment at another facility. Reporting to public health is critical, as Dr. Pettit's email illustrated. d. Communication with exposed patients during periods of great uncertainty was very important. Public health played a vital role in finding exposed patients that were difficult to reach and when clinic staff were overwhelmed with the task at hand. e. Communication with media: Frequent press-briefings allowed TDH to effectively communicate important public health messages in a dynamic and rapidly evolving outbreak while allowing staff to continue to do critical work.
Conclusion:
This has been a devastating outbreak for patients, their families and friends, healthcare providers and clinics. In Tennessee we still have many patients hospitalized and suffering from complications and others who are exposed and frightened that they may become infected. Sustained commitment to funding for emergency preparedness and reduction of healthcare associated infections through cooperative agreements from the CDC has supported our productive relationships with our partners and healthcare providers across the state. These pre-existing relationships allowed us to respond quickly because we trusted each other. We all need to work together to do our best to prevent such a tragedy from occurring again and to ensure that we have the public health capacity to detect and rapidly respond to any future outbreaks.
Thank you for your time and attention.
